Lines of (F) (Shields 1991: 43, Patton 1994: 158). As Dcleuze claims, they are 'machines which make one see and speak ' (1992a: 160) . All social apparatuses, from sovereignty to discipline and beyond, feature regimes of light, regimes of enunciation, as well as lines of force that cross between the visible and the utterable and constitute their power dimension (Deleuze 1992a) . Each dispositif therefore comprises, firstly, an optical machine. An optical machine consists of lines or planes (plans) of light which structurc fields of visibility and invisibility, illuminating some objects and causing others to disappear. Secondly, each apparatus includes a sonorous machine, comprising lines of enunciation, or that which can be enunciated in discourse or uttered in a system of signs. These 'modes of symbolic expression' (Patton 1994: 163) function to authenticate or authorize presences and absences in the visual field. Each social apparatus is an audio-visual machine whose specificity lies in its particular regime of light, its style or form of enunciation (that is to say discursive regularities) and finally, in the lines of force which forge links between the seeing and the saying (between situations and responses). (See Bakhtin's (1984] discussion of popularfestive forms).
death: 'a body destroyed piece by piece by the infinite power of the sovereign constituted not only the ideal, but the real limit of punishment ' (Foucault 1977: 50) . On the other hand, sovereign power has to be seen to be effective. It also has a strategic function: 'an execution that was known to bc taking place, but which did so in secret, would scarcely have any meaning' (Foucault 1977: 57-8) . It is by way of the spectacular, public marking of the body that sovereignty displays its capacity to unite sonorous and visible elements. By the act of directly inscribing on the body's surface sovereignty not only affirmed a dissymetrical and irreversible power relation, it also produced meaning -indelibly linking signifier and signified. For while sovereignty acts directly on bodies, as an apparatus of power/knowledge it indirectly targets the undifferentiated mass of witnesses to its display. 5overeign power is therefore also indiscriminate in its application, targeting as it does the social body as a whole. In this aspect, its power is limited to containing the meaning of the event, and in preventing the stagedorder from flooding its boundaries and becoming ambiguous. Subsequent resistance to sovereignty by carnivalcsque plays of meaning2 reversed the festival of violence (Foucault 1977: 63) . The inability to maintain the staged boundaries and contain the meaning of the spectacle was also a crisis which hastened the demise of sovereignty.
Disciplinary dispositives also have optical machines. The school has an optical machine for creating systems of presence and absence, the prison, a dissymetrical 'seeing machine' (Foucault 1977: 207 (Foucault, 1977:131 Arrighi's [1994: 23] (Deleuze 1991: 89) . It is preparatory, either of the progress toward a limit or of crossing a threshold. Moreover, it gathers and expresses these imperceptible qualities without ever actualizing them in a perceptual field.
While the close-up may appear as an act of enclosure par excellence, it is not a matter of cramming and arranging so many elements inside pre-existing boundaries (for example, the staged production), but is a special case of 'cutting out' or extracting a composition unit from the set (Aumont 1987: 36-7) . Similarly in Eisenstein, framing is a matter of 'hewing out a piece of actuality with the ax of the lens ' (1949: 41) . Because the close-up involves a cut, or the cutting out of an image from the materiality of its set, some argue that they have discovered a cinematic equivalent of a psychoanalytic structure of the unconscious (for example, a castration complex; see Kaite 1991: 176), and, as in Baudrillard, associate this with the fetishization of the partial-objects, which in turn correspond with poses of the commodity (in other words, when it is immobilized) 60 (sec also Krokcr and Lcvin [ 1991 ] and Dcbord's [ 1994: 12, 43 Wittgenstein, 1958: 33 Peirce (1955) , an icon is a kind of sign which refers to an object by virtue of a quality which it possesses, and which it possesses independent of whether any such object actually exists or not. Similarly, qualities cannot act as signs unless they are embodied: such 'quali-signs' are necessarily iconic (Peirce 1955: 115 ' (1994: 
